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DON'T DISCRIMINATE AGAINST DISTINCT OR
HIGHLY PERSONAL HARMS: AN ANALYSIS OF
SECTION 717 OF TITLE VII PERTAINING TO
PREEMPTION OF ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF
RECOVERY BY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
A. INTRODUCTION
An outstanding issue within federal courts is whether a federal em-

ployee may bring suit sounding in both tort and Title VII. Central to this
analysis is the judicial disposition of the courts regarding the meaning given to section 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as the "exclu-

sive, preemptive administrative and judicial scheme for the redress of federal employment discrimination." 1 Although preemptive limits were
outlined in the 1976 Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 2 courts are split as to who may be made a proper defendant, and
whether causes of action falling outside of being solely discriminatory may
be brought in conjunction with a Title VII claim.3 As recently as August
2012, when Charlot v. Donley4 was decided by a South Carolina District

Court, a clear consensus does not exist. This note will present case law,
academic writing, and policy arguments intending to resolve this uncertainty and define the reach of the Brown decision.

I

See Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 829 (1976) (recognizing Title VII as "ex-

clusive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme for the redress of federal employment
discrimination."); see also infra Part C(II)(c) (explaining differences among circuit and district
courts in interpreting preemptive language of Brown decision); infra Part B (providing background about Title VII).
2 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
3 See infra Part C.II. (outlining split among courts). Causes of action may include, but are
not limited to, intentional and negligent torts derived under state common law or authorized under
the Federal Torts Claim Act ("FTCA"). See infra Parts C.11.a.-c. (providing cases and their causes of action).
4 No. 3:11-579-MBS-SVH, 2012 WL 3264568 (D. S.C. Aug. 9, 2012). In October of 2012,
a Federal District Court in Mississippi heard a Title VII preemption case and held the opposite of
Charlot. See Stamper v. Shinseki, No. Civ. 311cv546, 2012 WL 5286953, at *10 (S.D. Miss.
Oct. 24, 2012) (holding Title VII preempted state law tort claims, including those against individual employees).
5 See Charlot,2012 WL 3264568, at *4 (acknowledging split amont circuits).
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B. FACTS
In 1964 the United States Congress passed Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, making employment discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin illegal.6 The 1964 version of
the law only acted upon private employment, and not federal employment.
In 1972, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (" EEOA"). 8 The amendment gave

6 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e 2000e- 17 (1970)). Section 703 of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or ... to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Civil Rights Acts of 1964, tit. VII, § 703 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)(a)(2) (1970)). Section 704 of Title VII states, "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because [the employee] has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII]." Civil Rights Acts of 1964,
tit. VII, § 704 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1970)).
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(b) (applying protections of Title VII only to private employees);
see also Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 825 (1976) (noting at time of decision "Title VII did not protect federal employees"). Prior to the passage of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, discrimination claims were handled intra-agency. Brown, 425 U.S. at 825. In some cases, an outside hearing examiner would be utilized; however, the examiner had no power to conduct an
independent investigation and findings were seen purely as recommendations. ld. Dissatisfied
employees did have an option for review first with the Board of Appeals and then review by the
Civil Service Commission ("CSC"). Id. Despite such options, federal employees were skeptical
"regarding the Commission's record in obtaining just resolutions of complaints and adequate
remedies ... in turn, discourag[ing] persons from filing complaints with the Commission for fear
that doing so will only result in antagonizing their supervisors and impair[] any future hope of
advancement." ld. at 825-26 (quoting S. REP. No. 92-415, at 14 (1971)); see also S. REP. No. 92415, p. 14 (1971). For those who were dissatisfied with a CSC decision, they could bring an action seeking to enjoin unconstitutional conduct; however, these actions often provided scant relief. Brown, 425 U.S. at 826 (explaining minimal likelihood of recovering backpay or compensatory relief).
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1972). Legislative adoption of Title VII § 717 waived sovereign
immunity of the Federal Government from suits by employees. Id.; see Major Gilligan, Litigation Division Note, Federal Agency "Joint Employer" Liability: Employment Discrimination
Claims by Independent ContractorEmployees, 1999-DEC ARMY LAW. 54, 55 (1999). Title VII
§ 717 states:
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment ... in military
departments . . . in executive agencies ...

in the United States Postal Service and the

Postal Regulatory Commission, in those units of the Government of the District of Co-
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federal employees an opportunity to pursue discrimination claims against
their federal employers after exhausting administrative remedies. 9
Title VII litigation has evolved to present varying claims under the
heading of employment discrimination. 0 Such claims include, but are not
limited to: disparate treatment or intentional discrimination claims, where a
protected class is factored into an employment decision, and harassment
based discrimination, including sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims, herein described as "decision-based" and "harassmentbased" discrimination claims, respectively.1 1 An understanding of these
concepts affords the opportunity to distinguish the Brown decision
from the
12
most recent developments in Title VII litigation within Charlot.
A "decision-based" discrimination action includes the more common disparate treatment and disparate impact claims."
In a disparate
treatment violation, the employer would have taken an employment action
because of a protected characteristic.14 Disparate impact suits involve an
employer's consideration of a "facially neutral criterion," which has a dis15
proportionate impact on a protected class.
These two types of claims
16
litigation.
VII
Title
make up a majority of
Beyond "decision-based" discrimination, "harassment-based" discrimination makes up a second class of Title VII claims. 1 7 These Title VII
claims include "unwanted sexual advances, requests for sexual favors or

lumbia having positions in the competitive service, and in those units of the judicial
branch of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service, in the
Smithsonian Institution, and in the Government Printing Office, the Government Accountability Office, and the Library of Congress shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16 (emphasis added); See also Sandra Fluke & Karen Hu, Employment Discrimination Against LGBTW Persons, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 613, 624 (2011) (noting only applicant, current, or former federal employee may bring Title VII claim).
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); Brown, 425 U.S. at 832; see also infra notes 122-127 and
accompanying text (discussing administrative remedies).
10 See
U.S.
DEPT.
OF
JUSTICE,
Employment
Section
Overview,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/emp/overview.php (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
11 See id. (presenting various Title VII claims).
12 See infra Part C(II) (analyzing differences between varying Title VII claims pertaining to
Brown).

13 See Employment Section Overview, Employment Section Overview, supra note 10 (outlining commonality of claims).
14 Id.

15 Id.
16 See

UNITED

STATES

DEPT.

OF

JUSTICE,

Employment

Section

Overview,

http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/emp/overview.php (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Employment Section Overview] (discussing commonality of claims).
17 See Employment Section Overview (outlining basics of "harassment-based" claims).
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conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
employment and create an abusive or hostile work environment."1 8 Prior to
1980, the EEOC, the administrative gate-keeping agency for Title VII
claims, did not issue guidelines pertaining to sexual harassment claims.1 9
C. HISTORY
In 1976, Brown held that Title VII is "an exclusive, preemptive
administrative and judicial scheme for the redress of federal employment
discrimination. 20 Courts have since struggled to interpret Title VII in the
context of federal employment discrimination preemption.2' To effectively
understand these differences, the inquiry must begin with the preemption
question as first developed in Brown.
L

Brown v. GeneralServs. Admin, 425 U.S. 820 (1976)

An effective understanding of the preemption question requires examination of the reasoning behind the Supreme Court's 1976 Brown decision. 23 The Brown Court considered a Title VII challenge by a black man,
Clarence Brown, claiming his employer, the General Services Administration ("GSA"), opted not to promote him on two occasions because of his
race. 2 4 Brown brought suit against the GSA under section 717 of Title VII
18 Employment Section Overview. These claims may be further divided into "quid pro quo"
or "hostile work environment," however this falls outside the necessary purview of this note. See
Enforcement Guide, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, 2 (Mar. 19, 1990),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/upload/currentissues.pdf (discussing types of "harassment-based" claims).
19 UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, N-915-050,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: POLICY GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

(1990), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/upload/currentissues.pdf (indicating
year when EEOC implemented sexual harassment guidelines).
20 Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 829 (1976).
21 See infra Part C(II) (outlining opposing perspectives among courts).
22 See infra Part C.I. (outlining Brown viewpoint of preemption).
23 See infra Part C.II.a.-c. (discussing circuit split stemming from Brown decision).
24 See Brown, 425 U.S. at 822-24 (explaining background of Brown case). Brown, classified
as a GS-7, had been employed by the GSA since 1957. Id. at 822. Brown received a promotion
in 1966, and in 1970 was considered, along with two white colleagues, for another promotion to a
GS-9 position. Ild.
Although all three men were equally qualified, a white man was chosen. Ild.
Brown subsequently filed a complaint with the GSA's Equal Employment Opportunity Office
("EEOO"). Ild.
Brown dropped his claim after being informed another GS-9 position would soon
become available, however, after being considered against two more white men, he was denied
his second opportunity for promotion. Ild.
Following the second decision, Brown again appealed
to the GSA's EEOO, who found Brown's failure to be "fully cooperative" during his employment
motivated the decision not to promote him, as opposed to any race-based animus on the part of
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and under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981.25
The Brown Court looked to the legislative history, completeness of
the statute, inapplicability of Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 26 and

comparable case law involving alternative forms of recovery, before holding that Title VII was the "exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment." 2 The Brown Court reasoned that legislative history supported preemption of Brown's alternative discriminationbased claims because Congress concluded that prior to the passage of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act federal employees had no effective judicial remedy.2 8 In explaining the completeness of the statutory design, the
Brown court looked to the clear and concise definitions of who was covered by the statute provided in section 717(a), complimentary administrative and judicial means to "eradicate federal employment discrimination" in
sections 717(b) and (c), coverage of "venue, the appointment of attorneys,
attorneys' fees, and the scope of relief' under section 717(d), as well as a
GSA. ILd. Brown then filed his lawsuit. Id.; see also infra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the grounds for Brown's lawsuit and Supreme Court holding).
25 Brown, 425 U.S. at 823-24; see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 717 (as codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16) (providing remedy for employment discrimination by federal employers); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (providing remedy for violation of equal rights under the law). 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 provides for the right to make and enforce contracts, which implies the right to be free of
illegal employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (explaining right to make and enforce
contracts); see also Brown, 425 U.S. at 833-34 (explaining inapplicability of § 1981 to federal
employment discrimination); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (explaining § 1981 "affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the
basis of race"); infra note 27 and accompanying text (detailing Brown court's rejection of §
1981). Brown also sought federal jurisdiction through claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, providing
general federal-question jurisdiction, and under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§
2201, 2202. See Brown, 425 U.S. at 823-24 (detailing remaining causes of action).
26 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
27 See Brown, 425 U.S. at 824-35 (explaining legislative history, completeness of statute, and
comparable case law). Brown filed his suit forty-two days after his appeal had been decided,
which fell outside the thirty-day requirement by section 717 of Title VII, and gave rise to the
question of subject matter jurisdiction if Title VII preempted all other remedies for federal employment discrimination. See id. at 823-24 (presenting time table and motion to dismiss for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Since Brown, § 2000e-16(c)
has been amended to extend the thirty-day timeframe to ninety days. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e16(c); see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 114(1), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(increasing time to file suit from thirty to ninety days).
28 See Brown, 425 U.S. at 828-29 (recognizing inference of preemptive nature of Title VII
via legislative history). "Senator Williams, sponsor and floor manager of the bill, stated that it
provides, for the first time ... for the right of an individual to take his complaint to court." ld. at
828 (internal quotations omitted) (citing 118 CONG. REc. 4922 (1972)). "Senator Cranston, coauthor of the amendment relating to federal employment, asserted that it would, (f)or [sic] the first
time, permit Federal employees to sue the Federal Government in discrimination cases .
l..."
Id.
(internal quotations omitted) (citing 118 CONG. REc. 4929 (1972)). The Brown court goes on to
state that regardless of whether the assumption was true or not, the statements go to show congressional intent to create an exclusive, preemptive statute. Id. at 828-29.
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concluding statement in section 717(e) pitting primary responsibility for
preventing discrimination on the federal employer. 29 The Court rejected
Brown's argument that Johnson supported utilizing pre-existing remedies
for federal employment discrimination because Johnson dealt with private
employment and did not involve sovereign immunity. o The argument was
further rejected because Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, protecting only private employees and addressed in Johnson, contained legislative
intent to supplement existing laws, as opposed to the EEOA, which did
not.3 1 The Brown court also looked to case law in recognizing that specific
statutes preempt general statutes, and placed great weight upon Preiserv.
Rodriguez,3 2 where the court, while addressing a civil rights statutory suit
brought in conjunction with a habeas corpus action, held that "although...
[the] civil rights statute was, by its terms, literally applicable .... challenges ...lie only under habeas corpus, the 'more specific act."' 33 The Brown
29

See Brown, 425 U.S. at 829-33 (presenting courts argument pertaining to completeness of

statute). The Brown court places special emphasis on § 717(c), which permits an employee to
seek relief in court, but only after pursuing administrative avenues of relief, and within 30 days of
receiving the administrative agencies final decision or 180 days after a CSC appeal. Id.at 832.
The Brown court states that § 717 "does not contemplate merely judicial relief ... it provides for
a careful blend of administrative and judicial enforcement powers" and if Brown's other avenues
of relief were not preempted, the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies and time limits
"would be driven out of currency were immediate access to the courts under other, less demanding statutes permissible." Id. at 833. The argument is summarized by the court's statement that
"[t]he balance, completeness, and structural integrity of [§] 717 are inconsistent with the petitioner's contention that the judicial remedy afforded by [§] 717(c) was designed merely to supplement other putative judicial relief." Brown, 425 U.S. at 832.
30 See id. at 833 (stating no issue of sovereign immunity in Johnson case).
31 See id.
(rejecting Johnson's applicability); see also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) ("[Civil Rights Act of 1964] manifests a congressional intent to allow
an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state
and federal statutes.") (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974))); H.R.
REP. No. 92-238, at 19 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2154 ("[R]emedies available to the individual under Title VII are co-extensive with the individual's right to sue under the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,42 U.S.C. 1981, and that the two procedures augment
each other and are not mutually exclusive.").
32 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
33 See Brown, 425 U.S. at 834-35 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973))
(discussing specifically drawn statutes against general statutes). The Preisercourt explained that
reliance upon the general civil rights statute would not require the same exhaustion of state remedies as a habeas corpus petition, and would thus undermine the strong policy requiring exhaustion
of these remedies. 411 U.S. at 488-90. The viewpoint espoused in Preiserwas given great deference by the Brown court given its relativity to its impression of the completeness of section 717
of Title VII. See Brown, 425 U.S. at 834-35 (supporting Preiserholding); see also supra note 29
and accompanying text (discussing statutory completeness of § 717). One case that the Brown
court approvingly cited was U.S. v. Demko. See Brown, 425 U.S. at 834 (citing United States v.
Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966)) (citing Demko for its similarity to "right to proceed under facially
applicable tort recovery statutes."). In Demko, a federal prisoner was injured and filed suit under
18 U.S.C. § 4126, a statute enacted in 1934, twelve years prior to the FTCA. 385 U.S. at 149-52.
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decision leaves open the question of whether actions to remedy behavior
that may be more 3than
discriminatory fall within the purview of Title Vii's
4
preemptive reach.
II.

Dispositionof the Courts

Since the Brown decision, courts have been divided as to whether
Title VII preempts tort claims arising out of the same-facts as a Title VII
employment discrimination suit.15 The Ninth Circuit has applied the "highly personal harm" test, recognizing that a highly personal violation goes
beyond the meaning of discrimination. 3 6 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits
have come to the opposite conclusion by holding that claims arising out of
the same facts supporting the Title VII claim are preempted.3
District

The statute provided federal prisoners with their only opportunity to recover damages of any
kind. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 4126(c), (c)(4) (1948) ("[T]he Government, is authorized ... in
paying . . . compensation to inmates employed in any industry, or performing outstanding services in institutional operations, and compensation to inmates or their dependents for injuries suffered in any industry or in any work activity in connection with the maintenance or operation of
the institution in which the inmates are confined."). After succeeding under § 4126 the prisoner
filed a claim under the FTCA, which the Demko court held was preempted by § 4126. 385 U.S.
at 149-52. The court reasoned that nothing in the FTCA gave any indication it was meant to add
to recovery of prisoners protected by § 4126, nor would such a finding be rational, as prisoners
would be given greater rights than government employees seeking recovery under the Federal
Employees Compensation Act ("FECA"). Id. at 152; see also FECA, 5 U.S.C. § 751 (1916) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 8102) (allowing federal employees to recover for death or disability
resulting from personal injury while working). But cf. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150,
150-52 (1963) (holding prisoners not protected by prison compensation law, not barred from
seeking relief under FTCA). The Supreme Court examined a similar question in Johansen v.
United States, where seamen were injured while performing their work related duties. 343 U.S.
427, 428 (1952). The seamen brought suit under the Public Vessels Act of 1925, which provided
consent by the Government to be sued for personal injuries of a non-government individual
caused by negligent maintenance or operation of a public vessel of the United States. Johansen,
343 U.S. at 428, 431. Although it is unclear from the decision whether the seamen sought remedy under FECA, the statutory remedy was held to be applicable to the seamen. See Id. at 439
(recognizing FECA applies to all federal employees). The Johansen court further held that FECA
is the exclusive remedy for civilian seamen, reasoning "had Congress intended to give a crew
member on a public vessel a right of recovery for damages against the Government beyond the
rights granted other Government employees on the same vessel under other plans for compensation, we think that this advantage would have been specifically provided." Ild. at 440.
34 See infra Part C.II. and Part D. (presenting and analyzing case law pertaining to Title VII's
preemptive reach as interpreted in Brown).
35 See infra Part C.II.a.-b. (presenting cases representing split among circuits regarding Title
VII's preemptive reach).
36 See infra Part C(II)(a) (explaining development of Ninth Circuit's "highly personal" harm
approach).
37 See infra Part C(II)(b) (explaining development of Fifth and Eighth Circuits' "same facts"
approach).
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courts are also split on the issue.38
a.

"Highly Personal" Harm (Ninth Circuit)

In Otto v. Heckler,3 9 the Ninth Circuit became the first circuit to
hold that an independent claim against a supervisor, in his individual capacity, may arise out of the same set of facts supporting a Title VII claim. a
The Ninth Circuit revisited this topic again in Brock v. United States,41
however, the contest in Brock focused on employer liability as opposed to
individual liability.4 2 In Brock, the court considered whether Title VII
barred a Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") action against the plaintiff's
employer for actions including repeated sexual comments, unwanted touching, and forcible rape.4 3 The Brock court held that the complaint described
38 See infra Part C.II. (outlining opinions of district courts pertaining to Title VII's preemp-

tive reach).
39 781 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1986), amended by, 802 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986).
40 See Otto, 781 F.2d at 756-57 ("[T]orts which constitute highly personal violation[s] beyond the meaning of discrimination [are] separately actionable.") (internal quotations omitted).
In Otto, Mari Otto, an employee of the Inglewood Social Security Administration ("SSA"), was
supervised by Howard Jacobson. Id. at 755. Otto, alleging Jacobson had sexually harassed her,
filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint, and soon thereafter attempted to add a retaliation complaint that was denied for reasons related to a pending class claim. Id. Following this
denial Otto filed a judicial complaint against Jacobson, as both an individual and as a SSA manager, claiming Title VII violations, as well as state common-law tort claims of assault, invasion of
privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. ld. Central to these tort
claims was Otto's accusations that Jacobson would make defamatory remarks about her sexuality,
follow her, telephone her, and place her in fear of sexual abuse. Id. at 757. After the district
court dismissed all but the Title VII claims, the Otto court reversed the dismissal of the tort
claims and remanded the case to "ascertain whether Jacobson acted within the perimeter of his
authority." Id.; see also Arnold v. United States, 816 F.2d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir. 1987)
("Remedy for unconstitutional actions other than employment discrimination, even if arising
from the same core of facts, is not barred by Title VII."). A distinguishing component of this
case is that it addressed claims against the supervisor in an individual capacity, but not the federal
employer. See Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Brock's case is distinguishable from Otto and Arnold because she is suing for negligent supervision under the
FTCA, and because she is not suing McKinney directly.").
41 64 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995).
42 See id. at 1423-25 (outlining possibility of individual state tort liability and employer negligent supervision liability).
43 See Brock, 64 F.3d at 1422 (outlining material facts of the case). Brock, an employee of
the Forest Service, alleged that during field outings, where she was forced to share sleeping accommodations with her supervisor, he subjected her to unwanted physical contact, including
"rubbing her back, touching her breasts, and raping her." Id. After multiple incidents, Brock refused to work with McKinney and was reassigned. Id. McKinney still found opportunities to
make sexual comments and unwanted contact until Brock transferred to another department and a
filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") Title VII claim against McKinney and her employer, Id. Brock's EEOC claim was eventually settled; however, she was tormented by offensive comments by her coworkers because of her willingness to bring the EEOC
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conduct that was a "highly personal violation beyond the meaning of discrimination" and that the FTCA claim was separately actionable. 44 The
Court also gave special consideration to the insensibility of a non-protected
employee having access to an FTCA claim, while a protected employee
would be denied the same legal remedy. 5
In 2001, the Ninth Circuit heard Sommatino v. United States, 6 a
case involving discrimination in the form of sexual harassment.4 Despite
its similarity to Otto, Arnold, and Brock, it was disposed of on procedural
grounds, and the Sommatino court only touched upon the highly personal
harm standard in dicta.4 8 Shelley Sommatino ("Sommatino"), a civilian
employee at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California alleged
a co-worker, Mr. Hollifield ("Hollifield"), engaged in sexually discrimina-

claim. Id. Brock then filed an administrative tort claim under the FTCA, alleging negligent supervision of McKinney and negligent supervision of her coworkers. Ild. When the government
failed to respond to Brock's claim, she filed a negligence claim in district court, which was dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and an appeal
followed. Id.
44 See Brock, 64 F.3d at 1424 (recognizing Brock's negligent supervision claim not preempted by prior EEOC settlement). The Brock court relied upon the premise that "rape can be a form
of sexual discrimination, but we cannot say to its victims that it is nothing more " and that this
reality was unchanged regardless of whether the plaintiff sought damages from the individual or
through the employer. Id. at 1423. It was further stated that "as every murder is also a battery,
every rape committed in the employment setting is also discrimination based on the employee's
sex." Id. The court reasoned that the capability to classify the major offense-murder or rape-as a
minor offense-battery or employment discrimination-"does not change the nature or extent of
ultimate harm." Ild. The Brock court combined this rationale with its holding in Otto to hold that
where the harms suffered are more than just discrimination, the victim may bring a separate
claim. ld. (citing Otto, 781 F.2d at 756-57). The Brock court made certain to recognize the harm
suffered by Brock as involving something more than just garden-variety discrimination. Cornpare Brock, 64 F.3d at 1423 (highlighting rape as component of employment discrimination but
not being solely remediable by Title VII), with Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 813-15 (9th Cir.
1982) (noting failure to promote, retaliation for discrimination complaint, and constructive discharge are not separately actionable.); see also Schroder v. Runyon, 161 F.3d 18, 18 (10th Cir.
1998) (dismissing state-law retaliation claim brought in conjunction with Title VII claim); Krista
J. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liabilityfor Sexual Harassment in the Workplace,
134 U. PA. L. REv. 1461, 1463 (1986) (arguing pre-1991 interpretation failed to redress "severe..
harm caused by sexual harassment" in workplace).
45 See Brock, 64 F.3d at 1423 (explaining policy concerns appellate court affirmed the district court). The Brock court stated that Title VII would be "turned on its head" if the United
States could escape negligent supervision liability when misconduct was both assaultive and discriminatory but not where it was solely assaultive. Id. (emphasis added).
46 255 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 2001).
47 ld. at 705-07 (outlining facts and claims of case).
48 See id. at 707-08, 711-12 (outlining Sommatino's failure to satisfy prerequisite administrative remedies and discussing Title VII claims). The Sommatino court went on to compare the
facts of the case to those in Brock, Arnold, and Otto, despite stating it did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the Title VII claims, ld. at 711-12 (citing Brock, 64 F.3d at 1423-24; Arnold v.
United States, 816 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987); Otto, 781 F.2d at 758).
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tory conduct and filed for relief under the FTCA and Title VII. 49 The
Sommatino court concluded their opinion with dicta that Sommatino's allegations did not rise to the level of being a highly personal harm. 0 Circuit
Judge Reinhardt, in his concurrence in part and dissent in part, disagreed
with the majority as to whether the allegations rose to the level of being
highly personal harm, citing the similarity of Sommatino's facts to other
Ninth Circuit cases. 51

49 See Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 705-07 (detailing case's facts and legal theories pleaded).
Sommatino's non-Title VII theories alleged sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional
distress ("IIED"), negligent supervision, and negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED")
under the FTCA. Id. at 712-14. Sommatino alleged Hollifield "[m]ade sexually offensive remarks to her and other female employees, and would position himself close to her to ensure contact." Id. at 705. Sommatino further alleged Hollifield would "frequently brush[] his body
against Sommatino's arms, legs, and hips . . . [and] often used loud, offensive, and vulgar language in the office." ld. Sommatino stated Hollifield would fake accidental meetings outside the
office to engage her in private conversation. ld. at 706. Sommatino also included harms she alleges were suffered by co-workers within her complaint. Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 712. The court
recanted the allegations as follows:
Sommatino alleged that she witnessed "inappropriate behavior" on the part of Hollifield toward a female co-employee. She alleged that Hollifield accosted a woman when
he gave her a ride in his car. Sommatino alleged that the woman feared Hollifield and
would never be alone with him, and to appease Hollifield, the woman started bringing
him breakfast in the morning. Sommatino also alleged that Hollifield made forceful
sexual advances upon a female co-worker, but no names or dates are alleged. Sommatino alleged that Hollifield threatened to kill this female employee if she reported
him, but no additional specific allegations or supporting declarations are provided ....
Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 712 n.6.
50 See Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 711-12. The Sommatino court, although agreeing that Hollifield's actions were "highly offensive," explained
intentional touching and [Hollifield's] sexually suggestive and vulgar remarks are typical of the offensive workplace behavior giving rise to an action to remedy a hostile
work environment ... [and were] not of the order of magnitude of the personal violation of rape in Brock, the forced sexual assaults in Arnold (forced kissing, fondling,
and blocking the door), and the following and phone calling at home in Otto.
Id. at 712. But see id. at 712-14 (Reinhart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with majority about highly personal nature of harm). The majority opinion gave minimal
credence to Sommatino's statements about harmed coworkers, holding comments made to others
were not a component of the "order of magnitude of the conduct in this circuit's hostile working
environment cases." ld. at 712 (citing Kortan v. California Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1110
(9th Cir.2000)). But see id. at 712-14 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(disagreeing with majority that harm to others played no role in harm to Sommatino).
51 Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 713 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Circuit Judge Reinhardt compared Sommatino's facts to Arnold's facts and stated Hollifield's
"rubb[ing] his arms against [the plaintiff's] breasts, brush[ing] against her legs, arms and hips,
and restrain[ing] her outside the workplace" was synonymous to the facts of Arnold, where a
government employee "fondled [Arnold's] knees, blocked her exit from his office, and held the
plaintiff close to his body, kissing and fondling her." ld. (citing Arnold, 816 F.2d at 1307). Cir-
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Since Brock, numerous district courts have adopted the "highly
personal harm" approach. 52
b.

Same-Facts Preemption in the Fifth and Eighth Circuits

Despite having less popularity than the Brock "highly personal"
harms test, two circuits support the same-facts test. 5' The Fifth Circuit, in
Pfau v. Reed,54 and the Eighth Circuit, in Mathis
v. Henderson, present
S 56
reasonable arguments in favor of preemption.
The reasoning applied in
these cases, although not as commonly applied as the Brock perspective,
contributes to the ongoing development of Title VII federal-claim preemption.5
i.

Pfau (Fifth Circuit)

In Pfau, the Fifth Circuit advanced the most common argument in

cuit Judge Reinhardt concluded, based on the similarities to Arnold, that Hollifield's actions satisfied the highly personal test of Brock. Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 713 (citing Brock, 64 F.3d at
1424). Circuit Judge Reinhardt also concluded that the fears of Sommatino, based on alleged actions by Hollifield to co-workers, was "sufficient for purposes of this appeal ....
Sommatino,
255 F.3d at 713. Following his analysis, Circuit Judge Reinhardt concluded that the majority
opinion complicated the highly personal harm test, and courts would be better served to adopt a
standardized test. Id. Circuit Judge Reinhardt proposed, "if the conduct rises to the level of an
assault, it meets the standard for asserting [a FTCA] claim. If it does not, an FTCA claim may
not be asserted." ld. But see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2012) ("The provisions of [Tort Claims Procedure] .. . shall not apply to ... [a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights .... ); see also Jack W. Massey, A Proposal to Narrow the Assault and Battery Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1621, 1621-22
(2004) (discussing § 2680(h) exception to general waiver of sovereign immunity by federal government). Circuit Judge Reinhardt completed his opinion by considering the policy implications
of his decision and stating that although the door may have been opened for duplicative sex discrimination cases, if not already "opened by Brock, Otto, and Arnold... [e]stablishing a principled rule governing FTCA claims arising out of sexual harassment might even reduce, rather than
increase, the small number of such causes of action currently being filed." Sommatino, 255 F.3d
at 714.
52 See infra Part C(II)(c) (discussing district court interpretations).
53 See Charlot,2012 WL 3264568, at *4 (considering prominent tests); see also infra note 88
and accompanying text (discussing application of preemption tests); infra Part C(II)(c) (discussing same in greater detail).
14 125 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1997) vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 801 (1998) (advising
reconsideration of summary judgment motion on vicarious liability of employer).
55 243 F.3d 446 (8th Cir. 2001).
56 See infra Part C(II)(b)(i) (discussing Pfau); infra Part C(II)(b)(ii) (discussing Mathis).
57 Cf Charlot v. Donley, No. 3:11-579-MBS-SVH, 2012 WL 3264568, at *4 (D. S.C. Aug.
9, 2012) (considering same-facts test along with "highly personal harm" test).
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favor of preemption and held that "when the same set of facts support a Title VII claim and a non-Title VII claim against a federal employer, Title
VII preempts the non-Title VII claim., 58 In Pfau, the court considered
Pfau's Title VII sexual harassment claim, a state common law IIED, and an
FTCA claim against her supervisor, Pete Gonzales, and her employer, Defense Contract Audit Agency ("DCAA"). 5 9 Pfau claimed sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation as a result of reporting the sexual harassment. 60 The court relied upon a "not sufficiently distinct" standard and
the existence of her pending Title VII claims to dismiss Pfau's four arguments against preemption of her IIED claim.61
The first argument advanced and rejected by the court was that the
elements that must be proven to establish a sexual harassment claim under
Title VII are different from those necessary to establish an IIED claim. 6'
The Pfau court held that although two claims may feature "distinct legal
58 Pfau, 125 F.3d at 933 vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 801 (1998) (advising reconsid-

eration of summary judgment motion on vicarious liability of employer); see also Jackson v.
Widnall, 99 F.3d 710, 716 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating in dicta that constitutional violations involving
same facts as Title VII claim were preempted); Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir.
1992) (holding two claims on same set of facts "not sufficiently distinct to avoid the bar"); William J. Kelly III & Brooke Duncan III, Labor Law, 44 LoY. L. REV. 545, 560-61 (1998) (providing overview of Pfau case). Upon remand back to the Fifth Circuit, the court affirmed their Title
VII preemption holding and vacated and remanded the case back to the district court to examine
the summary judgment motion with respect to the Supreme Court's holdings in Faragherv. City
of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth. See Pfau 167 F.3d at 229 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 810 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742, 765-66 (1998)); see also Lisa A. May, Labor and Employment Law, 30 TEx. TECH L. REV.
811, 881 (1999) (discussing Fifth Circuit Pfau decision); Elizabeth Garrett, Arthur G. Lefrancois
& Sven Erik Holmes, Law and Economics, 31 N.M. L. REV. 107, 123 n. 99 (2001) (discussing
Supreme Court remand of Pfau).
59 See Pfau, 125 F.3d at 931-32 (discussing procedural history).
60 Pfau, 125 F.3d at 930-31 (discussing case's facts). In support of her sexual harassment
and discrimination claim, Pfau alleged that Gonzales called her and insisted upon visiting her at
her apartment, Gonzales appeared at Pfau's apartment and insisted they become "involved," as
well as Gonzales' offer to accompany Pfau on her vacation by paying his own way. 1d. at 931. In
support of the retaliation claim, Pfau alleged that Gonzales engaged in acts of retaliation after she
filed sexual harassment charges against him, including "sabotag[ing] work assignments to prevent
completion, hindering performance, withdrawing assignments, invalidating [Pfau's] audit findings, inappropriately discussing audit findings with contractor personnel, and subjecting her to
harsh, inordinate, and unwarranted criticism of work assignments." Id. Further allegations included claims that Gonzales denied her the training necessary to successfully advance to higher
level assignments, assigned her to auditing projects that did not comport with her level of experience, placed her on a performance improvement plan, and ultimately terminated her as a result of
her sexual harassment claims. Id. Prior to her termination, Pfau had been with the DCAA for 10
years. Id. at 930.
61 See id. at 931-32 (presenting "not sufficiently distinct" standard and discussing Pfau's legal arguments); see also infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text (explaining Pfau's arguments
and reasons for rejection).
62 Pfau, 125 F.3d at 931-33 (detailing Pfau's legal argument).
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elements," where the same facts could be used to establish both claims, the
non-Title VII claim was preempted.63 Where the same set of facts could
establish each claim, 64the Pfau court held that Pfau's two claims were "not
sufficiently distinct.,
The second argument advanced and rejected by the court was that
Title VII and IIED claims serve different purposes.65 The court disposed of
this argument under the "same-facts" standard applied to Pfau's first argument, and largely ignored the merits of the policy argument. 66 The Pfau
court completed its reasoning by stating, "[u]nder the controlling case law
in this circuit, the existence of multiple reasons for preventing a particular
type of conduct is therefore irrelevant to the determination of preemption.
The third argument advanced and rejected by the court was that
Pfau advanced "types and instances of conduct" in support of her IIED
claim differing from those supporting her Title VII claim. 6' The court held
that the occurrence of some instances of the sexual harassment falling outside of business hours or away from the office did not mean they could not
be applied to the Title VII claim.6 9 The court concluded by reasoning that

63 Pfau, 125 F.3d at 932-33 (rejecting Pfau's first legal contention). The Pfau court analyzed

the elements of sexual harassment and IIED. ld. The court first explained that a hostile environment discrimination claim requires, among other things, proof that the claimant suffered "unwelcome, harassing sexual conduct." Id. at 933 (citing Jones v. FlagshipInt'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719-20
(5th Cir. 1986)). The court then described an IfED claim as requiring proof that the claimant was
subjected to "extreme and outrageous conduct." ld. (citing Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619,
621 (Tex. 1993)). The court concluded that the occurrence of sexually harassing conduct could
establish the existence of the extreme and outrageous conduct element for IfED from the same
facts. Pfau, 125 F.3d at 933.
64 See Pfau, 125 F.3d at 932-33.
65 See Pfau, 125 F.3d at 932 (presenting Pfau's second argument and court's holding). Title
VII's purpose is to "[s]trike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in
employment." MeritorSav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (internal quotation omitted).
IfED claims provide individuals with protection from, and remedies for, injuries to their psyches
caused by conduct that is "utterly intolerable in a civilized community." See Twyman, 855
S.W.2d at 621-22. The Pfau court considered the Brock court's holding but expressly stated it
would decline to adopt the Ninth Circuit's decision. 125 F.3d at 933 n.2. The Pfau court supported this position by stating that Brock was "inconsistent with the jurisprudence of this circuit"
and that the "factual predicate" being the same for the Brock plaintiff's non-Title VII claims and
her Title VII claims preempted non-Title VII liability. See id. (citing Jackson, 99 F.3d at 716;
Rowe, 967 F.2d at 189) (explaining rejection of Ninth Circuit's Brock decision).
66 Pfau, 125 F.3d at 933 (citing same facts standard).
67 Pfau, 125 F.3d at 933. It is notable that the Pfau court does not cite any cases supporting
this assertion. Id.
68 See Pfau, 125 F.3d at 932-33 (presenting Pfau's third argument and court's holding).
69 Pfau, 125 F.3d at 933; see also Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 66-67 (holding plaintiff
who suffered sexual harassment during and after office hours stated Title VII claim). In Meritor
Savings Bank, the Supreme Court held that a hostile work environment could be created by ac-
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Pfau should not be permitted to avoid preemption by "picking and choosing" how to allocate facts amongst her Title VII and independent tort
claims. v
The fourth and final argument advanced and rejected by the court
was that the IIED claim was cognizable under the FTCA and could not be
preempted by Title VII.71 The court disposed of the argument by stating
the more general FTCA was preempted by the more precisely drawn Title
VII. 2 The Pfau court supported the theory that Title VII was more precisely drawn by its quoting of the Brown court's understanding of Title VII as
the "exclusive, preemptive administrative and
judicial scheme for the re3
dress of federal employment discrimination." ,
ii.

Mathis v. Henderson (Eighth Circuit)

In Mathis, the Eighth Circuit considered Title VII and collateral
state tort claims filed against Mathis's individual supervisor, Wayne Dick4
("Dick") and her employer, the United States Postal Service ("USPS").7
The Mathis court, applying the same-facts test, held that Mathis could not
bring state tort claims against Dick in his individual capacity where she
used the same decertified incidents to prove she was subjected to severe
and pervasive harassment under the Meritor/Harrishostile work environ-

tions that occurred both during and after work hours. 477 U.S. at 60, 73.
70 Pfau, 125 F.3d at 933.
71 Pfau, 125 F.3d at 932, 934.
72 Pfau, 125 F.3d at 934. The Pfau court relied on the Brown court's recognition that "a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies" in holding that Title VII did not
permit additional FTCA remedies. Id. (quoting Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 834
(1976)). The Pfau court did not discuss whether the IIED claim would be valid under the FTCA.
See id.at 934 (assuming IIED claim under FTCA valid without answering question).
73 Id. at 934 (quoting Brown, 425 U.S. at 829) (inferring Title VII designed to reach every
facet of employment discrimination).
74 See Mathis v. Henderson, 243 F.3d 446, 447, 449-50 (8th Cir. 2001) (describing facts,
Westfall certification under FTCA, and procedural history). Mathis brought a sexual harassment
and retaliation claim under Title VII, an Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim, a breach
of implied contract claim, and various state statutory and common law claims, including loss of
consortium. ld.at 447. Under the Westfall Act, a provision modifying federal employer liability
under the FTCA, the Attorney General may certify that the defendant was acting within the scope
of employment and substitute the United States into the role of defendant. See 28 U.S.C. §
2679(d) (1994) (explaining certification). Despite certification, a plaintiff has the option of challenging the certification, which Mathis did. See Mathis, 243 F.3d at 447 (discussing Mathis's
challenge of Attorney General's certification); see also Heuton v. Anderson, 75 F.3d 357, 360
(8th Cir.1996) ("Westfall certification does not conclusively establish that the United States
should be substituted as party defendant."). Rather than consider the Westfall issue, the appeals
court focused upon the Title VII preemption issue. Mathis, 243 F.3d at 448-49 (noting Title VII
preemption provides Dick immunity from suit).
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ment test.
The court's rationale stated, "either supervisor Dick's extracurricular conduct was part of a pattern of employment discrimination, that
is, sexual harassment, within the meaning of Title VII, which then is her
sole remedy, or it was the individual tortious action of Dick for which he is
personally responsible." ,6 The Court further reasoned that allowing this
circumvention goes against Brown's preemption of any other means for
rectifying that which falls under the heading of employment discrimination.

75 See Mathis, 243 F.3d at 450-51 (holding preemption from using same facts for state
tort
and Title VII claims). Mathis's claim included three decertified, specific incidents, occurring in
1994 during or after the USPS quarterly staff meetings in different locations. See id. at 449 (outlining conduct plaintiff relied upon for Title VII and independent tort claims). The Mathis court
explained the incidents as follows:

Mathis claims that some employees attended one of these meetings wearing what has
been described as hats that were intended to resemble condoms, and then referred to
themselves as "dick heads." Although Dick was not himself wearing one of the "hats,"
he was present and did not act, as supervisor, to stop the activity. On another occasion,
according to Mathis, Dick and Mathis were among USPS employees who had stayed
past the meeting (until 1:30 in the morning, in fact) drinking and playing poker. As
Mathis started to leave, an inebriated Dick insisted upon knowing where she was going
and told her in no uncertain terms to sit down. Following yet another meeting, in a hotel bar where a group of USPS employees including Dick and Mathis had gathered,
Dick demanded that Mathis dance every dance with him.
Mathis, 243 F.3d at 499. The Mathis court couched its decision in the Supreme Court's requirement that conduct must be severe or pervasive to create a hostile working environment. See
Mathis, 243 F.3d at 450 (holding decertified incidents cannot be used for both severe and pervasive element and state-law claims); see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)
("[Conduct] must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment."' (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982))); Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (clarifying
Meritor as requiring conduct be objectively and subjectively severe or pervasive). When considering Dick's actions that were certified and dismissed on procedural grounds, the Mathis court
concluded that Westfall's certified behavior fell under Title VII preemption as the "exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment." See Mathis, 243 F.3d at 449
(citing Brown, 425 U.S. at 835).
76 Mathis, 243 F.3d at 451. The Mathis court stated that under Brown it could not, and outside of Brown, would not, give a plaintiff "carte blanche to creatively plead as many state-law
causes of action as she believes she may sustain against her supervisor, in addition to her Title
VII claim, when, at its core, her claim is for sexual harassment by a supervisor, for which the
government already stands liable under Title VII and Ellerth." Id.at 451. The Mathis court reasoned that Mathis was not being denied her day in court, however, she would only be eligible to
pursue the Title VII claim arising out of the incidents she would have used for the alternative
claims. Id.
77 Id.at 451 (quoting Brown, 425 U.S. at 833) ("It would require the suspension of disbelief
to ascribe to Congress the design to allow its careful and thorough remedial scheme to be circumvented by artful pleading.").
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District Court

While most of the litigation surrounding Title VII preemption has
occurred in the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, district courts have also
contributed to the understanding of Brown's preemptive reach.7' The
Charlot court's illustration of circumstances considered in other district
courts, coupled with its approval of the "highly personal harm" approach,
provides an accurate picture of the state of Title VII preemption throughout
various district courts. 9 Similarly, the viewpoints espoused in Kibbe v.
1
Potter,0 Roland v. Potter,"
Wallace v. Henderson,12 and Baqir v. Principi" further contribute to the understanding of Brown.8 4 These interpretations are essential in understanding how each rule impacts varying fact8 5patterns regarding employment discrimination and concurrent tort claims .
In Charlot v. Donley,8 6 Vera Shepard Charlot ("Charlot"), a civilian employee of the Department of the Air Force ("Air Force"), filed a Title VII and a state common law defamation tort claim against the Air Force,
Honorable Michael B. Donley ("Donley"), Terry St. Peter ("St. Peter"),
8
Dawn M. Moore ("Moore"), and Clayton D. Leishman ("Leishman"). 7

78 See infra note 88 and accompanying text (detailing differing viewpoints); see also supra

Part C.II. (outlining circuit opinions).
79 See infra note 88 and accompanying text (listing prominent district court cases); see also
supra Part C.II.c. (providing further details from Charlot case).
80 196 F.Supp.2d 48 (D. Mass. 2002).
81 366 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (S.D. Ga. 2005).
82 138 F. Supp. 2d 980 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
83 288 F. Supp. 2d 706 (W.D.N.C. 2003).
84 See infra notes 89-96, 101-105, 110-111 and accompanying text (applying Title VII).
85 See infra notes 92-93, 100-101, 102-105 and accompanying text (presenting variety of fact
patterns involving Title VII preemption analysis)
86 No. 3:11-579-MBS-SVH, 2012 WL 3264568 (D. S.C. Aug. 9, 2012).
87 Charlot, 2012 WL 3264568, at *1. Pre-trial motions were heard before a magistrate judge
and were brought before the district court on appeal from the magistrate judge's ruling on a Rule
12(b)(1) subject matter question. See id. (explaining procedural history). Charlot's position as a
civilian employee of the Air Force was Training Technician with the Defense Language Institute
English Language Center ("DLIELC") at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Id. The court explained
the hierarchy of Charlot's supervisors listing Donley as Secretary of the Air Force, Leishman as
Charlot's direct supervisor, and Moore as Leishman's immediate supervisor as well as Charlot's
second line supervisor. Id. (discussing hierarchy of Charlot's superiors to help clarify factual discussion). The court held that the Title VII claims were only valid against the head of an agency,
department, or unit and affirmed the dismissal of claims of Title VII violation against all defendants but Donley. Id. at *3. The court then examined Charlot's defamation claims against Leishman and Moore. See id. at *3-5 (analyzing whether Title VII preempted defamation claims
against Leishman and Moore). Charlot's defamation claims against Leishman arose out of events
in August 2009 and were outlined by the court as follows:
Leishman called the Military Police to remove Plaintiff from DLIELC offices . . . re-
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The Charlot court outlined the split among circuits regarding Title VII
preemption of alternative causes of action, and found the views of the
Ninth Circuit in Brock, and its progeny, to be "persuasive."8 8 The Charlot
court held that the scope of Brown did not extend to Charlot's defamation
cause of action, despite its origin from a similar set of facts as the discrimination claim. 9 The Charlot court reasoned that the defamation claim

sult[ing] in public embarrassment and reputational damage .... Leishman falsely told
others that [Charlot] was a threat and that she had attempted to evade Military Police
when they arrived to escort her from DLIELC offices ....Leishman then made additional false statements to ...Moore in his proposal for a ten-day suspension of [Charlot] from DLELC.
Id. at *2. Charlot also alleged More defamed her by referring to Charlot as "crazy" during
Moore's investigation of Charlot's complaint. Ild.
88 See Charlot, 2012 WL 3264568, at *4-5 (outlining circuit split and recognizing Ninth Circuit approach as being persuasive). The Charlot court did mention Pfau and Mathis, but failed to
discuss either case beyond inferring their wide-reaching preemption. See id. at *4 (referencing
Pfau and Mathis). Greater consideration was given to the Brock line of reasoning; the Charlot
court quoted the Brock court as stating, "Title VII is not the exclusive remedy for federal employees who suffer 'highly personal' wrongs, such as defamation, harassing phone calls, and physical
abuse ....When the harms suffered involve something more than discrimination, the victim can
bring a separate claim." See id.at 4 (quoting Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir.
1995)) (highlighting court's rationale). Great deference was also given to the opinion of a Massachusetts District Court, which held in favor of the highly personal harms test. See Charlot,
2012 WL 3264568, at *4 (citing Kibbe v. Potter, 196 F. Supp. 2d 48, 69 (D. Mass. 2002)). The
Kibbe court held that the plaintiff's claims of assault and IIED were highly personal actions and
were not subject to Title VII preemption; it also noted that the First Circuit has interpreted Title
VII as "supplementing, not supplanting, existing rights." See Charlot, 2012 WL 3264568, at *4
(citing Kibbe, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 69-70). Although discussed in lesser detail than Brock and
Kibbe, the Charlot court cites four other district court cases supporting the "highly personal
harm" test. See Charlot, 2012 WL 3264568, at *4 (citing Wallace v. Henderson, 138 F. Supp. 2d
980, 986 (S.D. Ohio 2006); Roland v. Potter, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1236 (S.D. Ga. 2005); Boyd
v. O'Neil, 273 F. Supp. 2d 92, 96 (D.D.C. 2003); Stewart v. Thomas, 539 F. Supp. 891, 896
(D.D.C. 1982). The Charlot court also noted that the district courts of the Fourth Circuit are
similarly split on the issue. See Charlot, 2012 WL 3264568, at *5 (noting split among Fourth
Circuit district courts). Within the Fourth Circuit, the Charlot court cited two cases supporting
the highly personal harm test, one case providing a blanket statement about Title VII and appearing to support the highly personal harm test, and the other case supporting the same-facts test. Id.
at *5 (citing Schoolcraft v. Wabtec Passenger Transit,No. 7:11-0294-TMC, 2011 WL 5909943,
at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 28, 2011) (recognizing highly personal harm test in context of removal jurisdiction); Beatty v. Thomas, No. Civ.A. 2:05CV71, 2005 WL 1667745, at *7 (E.D. Va. June 13,
2005) (allegations of defamation not preempted by Title VII); Baqir v. Principi, 288 F. Supp. 2d
706, 709 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (supporting same-facts test); Baird v. Haith,724 F. Supp. 367, 373 (D.
Md. 1988) ("[A]lthough the reach of the Brown decision is broad, it cannot act to pre-empt causes
of action which, while arising from the same set of facts, are completely distinct from discrimination.").
89 See Charlot, 2012 WL 3264568, at *4-5 (holding defamation claims not preempted). In
coming to this conclusion it is notable that the Charlot court distinguished this case's inclusion of
state-tort and Title VII claims from Fourth Circuit cases holding that the plaintiff s tort claims for
IIED or NEID, as authorized by the FTCA, were preempted by his Title VII discrimination claim.
See id. at *3 (citing Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4th Cir. 2004)). The Pueschel
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sought to remedy her reputation, which was a "highly personal harm distinct from the harm her Title VII claim seeks to address." 90
In Kibbe v. Potter,91 a district court in Massachusetts considered
the preemptive reach of Brown regarding a Title VII discrimination suit and
the personal liability of a co-worker. 92 The Kibbe court, although recognizing that the First Circuit had not considered the issue presented, gave credence to the Circuit's understanding that Title VII seeks to supplement, but
not supplant, existing rights. 93 The Kibbe court went on to support the rationale announced in Wood v. United States,94 recognizing that Title VII
and Brown consider sovereign immunity, and do not intend to "disturb"
pre-existing avenues of relief against individuals in their personal capacity. 95 Ultimately the Kibbe court saw fit to support the "highly personal
harms" test, rejecting the same-facts test advocated by Griffin. 96 Although
stated in dicta, the Kibbe court noted that assault and IIED claims were distinct from a malicious interference with employment claim, which the court
recognized as "akin" to Title VII. 97
Roland, like Charlot, considered both the same-facts and highly
personal harms approach.9 8 In Roland, the plaintiff, who was demoted after selling beauty products during work hours, brought Title VII race dis-

court reasoned that the IIED and NEID claims were preempted because the emotional distress
was a direct result of the discrimination. Id.
90 Charlot, 2012 WL 3264568, at *5.
91 , 196 F. Supp. 2d48 (D. Mass. 2002)
92 Kibbe, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 68-69. The Kibbe court considered claims of three plaintiffs,
one of whom alleged assault and all of whom alleged lIED, against the employer and a coworker, Daniel Griffin ("Griffin"). Id. at 62. These common law claims were also considered in
conjunction with Title VII sexual harassment and retaliation claims. Id. All claims alleged Griffin grabbed his crotch and his buttocks on numerous occasions in front of the female plaintiffs.
See id. at 55-60 (outlining facts of case). The assault cause of action arose out of an interaction in
the parking lot where Griffin allegedly swerved his car in the plaintiff's direction. See id.at 60
(presenting background of assault claim).
93 ld.at 69 (citing Ramos v. Roche Products, Inc., 936 F.2d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 1991).
94 760 F.Supp. 952 (D. Mass 1991). In Wood the court held that common law assault and
battery claims against a co-worker survived Title VII preemption. ld.at 957.
95 See Kibbe, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (utilizing holding of Wood court in supporting it's holding). The Wood court recognized that Title VII seeks to protect the federal government from unconsented suits, which invade the public treasury and mandate government action, and a suit
against an individual would not qualify. Wood, 760 F. Supp. at 956.
96 See Kibbe, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 69-70 (announcing position of court).
97 See Kibbe, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (noting difficulty regarding malicious interference with
employment claim). The Kibbe court stated that because the malicious interference with employment claim would fail on the merits, it did not need to contemplate the close relationship of
the claim to Title VII. Id.
98 See Roland v. Potter, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1235-36 (S.D. Ga. 2005) (recognizing varying
views on preemption).
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crimination claims in conjunction with a state law IIED claim. 99 Despite
the plaintiff's claims that the demotion was "'so insulting as to naturally
humiliate, embarrass and frighten [her],' subjecting her to serious emotional distress," the court recognized that the IIED claim was wholly derivative
of the Title VII claim.l°° Citing this similarity, the court appeared to support the same-facts test by stating that the plaintiff failed to assert facts pertaining to her state law claim that were different from her Title VII
claim. 101

While Roland did hold against the plaintiff's IIED claims, it gave
great consideration to Wallace, a case that provides a very accurate depiction of the contrast between "highly personal harms" and claims preempted
by Title VII. 102 In Wallace, the plaintiff, who witnessed sexual harassment
of a colleague and testified against the harassers fell victim to constant harassment. 10 The harassment included "threats to his life, threats to his employment, threats of serious injury to him, harassing language and gestures,
and stalking." 10 4 The court noted that to preclude such claims would deprive a remedy for injuries not addressed by Title VII.' 05 Ultimately the
Wallace court established boundaries between IIED claims that arise from
retaliation, which Title VII preempts, and claims for conduct
outside of re106
taliation that caused distress, which are not preempted.
The Baqir case, which supports the same-facts test, presents facts
that very much coincide with the theory behind the same-facts view.10 7 In
Baqir the plaintiff alleged numerous Title VII causes of action, including
race-based and age-based disparate treatment, a hostile work environment
claim, and retaliation. 0 8 The plaintiff further alleged breach of contract,
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, defamation, and blacklist-

99 Roland, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 1235.

100 Id. at 1236.
101 See id. at 1236 (appearing to analyze facts from perspective of same-facts test).
102 See Roland, 366 F.Supp.2d at 1236 (analyzing Wallace).
103 Wallace v. Henderson, 138 F. Supp. 2d 980, 981 (S.SD. Ohio 2006).
104

Id.

105

Wallace, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 986.
See id. (establishing guidelines regarding preemption); see also Brunetti v. Rubin, 999

106

F.Supp. 1408, 1412 (D. Colo. 1998) (recognizing similar understanding as Wallace regarding differing means of harm).
107 See Baqir v. Principi, 288 F. Supp. 2d 706, 708-09 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (noting policy behind Title VII).
108 See Baqir, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 707 (listing causes of action). The basis of the defamation
claim was the alleged reporting of false information to the National Practitioner Data Bank premised upon malicious intent and discriminatory motive, Id. at 709. The basis of the blacklisting
claim was that the employer's written and spoken actions prevented the plaintiff from gaining
employment with other prospective employers, ld.
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ing. 0 9 The Baqir court, highlighting the policy argument of Preiser, dismissed the breach of contract and wrongful discharge claims without much
independent analysis.11 0 The court went on to find that the facts supporting
defamation and blacklisting, also supported the plaintiff's theory of Title
VII retaliation, and subsequently dismissed both counts.1 1 1
d.

Why Bring a Tort Claim

Rules and complications of the Title VII claims against a federal
employee make collateral tort claims an attractive option for attorneys
seeking to recover to the fullest extent for their client.1 1 2 One such rule is a
cap on recovery via the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("CRA91"). 1
Another
consideration includes satisfying the aforementioned administrative requirements. 114 Further consideration must also be given to statutes of limitations. 115 Tort claims also have a different purpose than do Title VII
claims, making them more attractive depending upon the circumstances. 116
i.

Civil Rights Act of 1991

In 1991, Congress passed the CRA91, authorizing compensatory
damages in Title VII cases and punitive damages in non-federal employment Title VII cases, but capped recovery in relation to the size of the employer. 117 Under the CRA91, compensatory damages could be awarded for

109 Baqir, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 707 (listing causes of action). The basis of the blacklisting
claim was that the employer's written and spoken actions prevented the plaintiff from gaining
employment with other prospective employers. Id.
110 See Baqir,288 F.Supp. 2d at 708 (dismissing claims based on "authorities cited above").
The Preisercourt stated, "[t]he crucial administrative role that each agency together with the Civil Service Commission was given by Congress in the eradication of employment discrimination
would be eliminated by the simple expedient of putting a different label on [the] pleadings." Id.
(citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90) (internal quotations omitted).
III Baqir,288 F. Supp. 2d at 709.
112 See infra notes 117-120 and accompanying text (discussing requirements within CRA91);
Part C.d..ii. and accompanying text (discussing administrative requirements); see also infra
Part C.II.d.iv. and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Title VII and tort law).
113 See infra notes 117-120 and accompanying text (detailing recovery rules of CRA9 1).
114 See infra Part C(II)(D)(ii) and accompanying text (discussing administrative requirements).
115 See infra Part C(II)(D)(iii) and accompanying text (discussing statute of limitations issues).

116 See infra Part C(II)(D)(iv) and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Title VII and
tort law).
117 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2012) (detailing compensation rules). The provisions of the
CRA91 were applied to claims under sections 706 (private employer claims) and 717 (federal
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"future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses."11 At
the lowest end of the spectrum, employers with "more than 14 and fewer
than 101 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year " would only be required to pay a combined maximum of $50,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.11 9 At the highest
end of the spectrum, employers with "more than 500 employees in each of
20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year "
could be liable for up to, but not exceeding $300,000 in combined compensatory and punitive damages. 12 Given the cap on Title VII claims, filing
additional claims against the employer, or perhaps against an employee,
becomes an attractive option. 121

employer claims). 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1). Punitive damages could be awarded in actions
against private employers, but not against a federal employer. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (discussing punitive damage requirements). The CRA91 specifically noted compensatory and punitive
caps did not include consideration of back pay, and also authorized jury trials. 42 U.S.C. §§
1981a(b)(2), (c). In enacting the CRA91 Congress acted upon findings that
(1) additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and
intentional discrimination in the workplace; (2) the decision of the Supreme Court in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the scope and
effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections; and (3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful discrimination in employment.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). In conjunction with
these findings, the stated purposes of the CRA91 was the following:
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace; (2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job
related" enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); (3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory
guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.); and (4) to respond to recent decisions of
the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to
provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071.
118 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3); see also Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The
Migration from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2115, 2142-43 (2007)
(providing further insight into compensatory damage rules).
119 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(b)(3)(A). It is essential to remember that a federal employer
cannot be required to pay punitive damages. See id. at (b)(1) (detailing punitive damage requirements).
120 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3)(D). Employers satisfying the twenty calendar week timeframe
with 101 to 200 employees or 201 to 500 employees would be capped at $100,000 and $200,000,
respectively. Id. at (3)(B)-(C).
121 See supra notes 44, 49, 60, 75-76, 87, 92, 99, 105, 111 and accompanying text (presenting cases where plaintiffs brought other claims in addition to Title VII claims).
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Administrative Requirements

Prior to bringing a Title VII lawsuit, a prospective plaintiff must
first exhaust administrative remedies. 122 Failing to exhaust administrative
remedies will forfeit the plaintiff's right to sue under Title VII. 123 The process begins with an employee filing a timely charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC and against their employer. 124 The EEOC, after
conducting its own investigation, may issue a right to sue letter to the employee. 125 After receiving the right to sue letter, the employee may then
bring a Title VII action against her employer.126 The same-facts and individuals depicted in the administrative claim must be depicted in the civil
complaint to fall within the EEOC's right to sue. 127
iii.

Statute of Limitations Issues

Title VII requires that an employee file a Title VII charge within
300 or 180 days of the alleged discriminatory practice. 12 Although later

122

See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 et seq. (presenting administrative requirements); Adminis-

trative requirements, 3 EMP. DISCRIM. COORD. ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW § 113:2 (2013)
[hereinafter DISCRIM. COORD.] (explaining administrative requirements); Annotation, Exhaustion
of remedies under Title VII (Equal Employment Opportunity) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.) as prerequisiteto maintenance of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 for
employment discrimination,23 A.L.R. Fed. 895 (2014) [hereinafter Exhaustion Annotation] (discussing Title VII exhaustion issues); Dianne Avery, VIL Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
in Litigating the Sexual Harassment Case, 27 A.B.A. J. (2000).
123 See National LAWYERS Guild, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT COMMITTEE, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies-Exhaustion of Remedies Under Title VII, 2 EMP. & UNION MEMBER
GUIDE TO LABOR LAW § 6:91 (2012).
124 See e.g., Exhaustion Annotation, 23 A.L.R. Fed. 895, § 3 (detailing process of instituting
claim); Avery, supra note 122 (same); DISCRIM. COORD., supra note 122 (same). Charges may
also be filed by state or local agencies on behalf of the employee. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(1). The
timing requirements of these charges are discussed in the following section. See infra Part
C.II.d.iii. (outlining timing requirements pertaining to statute of limitations issues).
125 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); DISCRIM. COORD., supra note 122 (discussing administrative
requirements, including right to sue letter). On some occasions, the EEOC will bring suit on behalf of the prospective plaintiff; however, in cases of federal employment discrimination, the
EEOC will only issue a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
126 See generally, e.g., Farrell, et al, 45C AM. JUR. 2D JOB DISCRIMINATION § 2009
(2013)
(outlining practice of satisfying administrative requirements); DISCRIM. COORD., supra note 122;
Avery, supra note 122.
127 Supra Farrell, note 126.
128 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(e)(1) (detailing statute of limitations); see also Avery, supra
note 122 (defining timing requirement). In cases of discrimination through compensation, the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 ("LLPA") loosened the 180 day requirement and provided
that each of the following will trigger the time for filing a charge of discrimination:
when a discriminatory compensation or other practice is adopted; when an individual becomes
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corrected by the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, the Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 129 statute of limitations case represents just
how easily a legitimate wrong fell through the cracks of legal remedy. 13
In Ledbetter, Lilly Ledbetter, a Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company employee, was found to have missed her window to contest discriminatory
pay issues, despite continually and unbeknownst to her, being paid less
than male counterparts throughout the course of her employment.131 Even
where discrimination is known, victims of discrimination may not always
become aware of their legal rights within the 300 or 180 day window, and
some may even fear reprisal for bringing claims.132 Particularly with sexual harassment, victims may initially be reluctant to bring claims due to social stigma and the intimate nature of their injuries. 133
iv.

Tort and Policy

Where Title VII seeks to "remov[e] barriers historically favor[ing]
one class of employees over another," tort claims have an entirely different
134
purpose: making a plaintiff-victim whole and deterring future conduct.

subject to a discriminatory compensation or other practice; or when an individual is affected by
application of a discriminatory compensation or other practice, including each time wages, compensation, or other benefits is [sic] paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.
Robin Shea, Obama Signs Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act: Goodbye Statute of Limitations,
CONSTANGY,
BROOKS,
&
SMITH,
LLP
(Jan.
29,
2009)
available at
http://www.constangy.com/assets/attachments/CB403 %5B 1%5D.pdf (internal quotations omitted).
129 550 U.S. 618 (2007), abrogated by Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
130 See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621 (rejecting Ledbetter's claim as time barred); cf id. at 645
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting "hidden" nature of discrimination against Lilly Ledbetter).
Without the intention of minimizing pay-based harm, such a circumstance is even more harmful
where the victim is subjected to sexual harassment, leaving severe emotional, and in some cases,
physical harm. See Schoenheider, supra note 44,44, at 1463 (noting harm caused by sexual harassment in workplace).
131 See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 624-42 (explaining reasoning for rejecting Ledbetter's claim as
time barred).
132 See Jane Byeff Korn, The Fungible Woman and Other Myths of Sexual Harassment, 67
TUL. L. REv. 1363, 1378 (1993) (outlining difficulty in bringing suit within 180 day window).
Korn, while describing the 180 day limitations window as "unusually short," acknowledges that
victims may be "unsure of their right to file a complaint." Id. Korn further describes some victims of sexual harassment as reluctant to file complaints. Id.
133 See id. Korn goes on to contrast the 180-day limit with the torts of assault, battery, and
IIED, which all are applicable in cases of sexual harassment and all have statutes of limitations of
at least one year. Id.
134 See Leta L. Fishman, Preemption Revisited: Title VII and the State Tort Liability After
InternationalUnion, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1047, 1055-58 (1993) (contrasting Title VII and tort);
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Title VII seeks to rectify work-place harms, and following the CRA91's
creation of compensatory damage capabilities, has improved in its capacity
to do so. 35 Despite this improvement, and in consideration of the recovery
cap, Title VII has failed to consider the intimate and often intangible harm
resulting from discrimination. 116
D. ANALYSIS
The intersection of Title VII and tort law creates an interesting interplay of constitutional and statutory rights, judicial interpretation, and
practical consequences. 13
In determining whether Title VII should be
found to preempt tort claims, consideration must be given to what constitutes a "highly personal harm," factors distinguishing Brown and its progeny, the legislative intent behind Title VII, and the practical consequences of
preempting tort claims via Title VII. 13 These elements, which are all relevant to the issue of Title VII tort claim preemption, can be effectively resolved to the benefit of the victim, and in a way that is consistent with
a
139
policy aimed at preventing workplace discrimination and harassment.
L

What is a "Highly PersonalHarm?"

In looking at employment discrimination, there are two key components: harm experienced relative to the employment opportunity, and
harm experienced in a personal capacity, independent of the working relationship. 140 By utilizing cases and examples debating the "highly personal
harm" approach, it is possible to develop an accurate picture of the types of
harms presented by and through acts also classified as employment discrimination. 14
Examining this picture leads to the conclusion that the
"same-facts" test fails to consider the intangible harms outside the protec-

Corn. Litig. in New York State Courts, 4B N.Y. PRAc. § 87:7 (Robert L. Haig, 3d ed., 2010) (defining goals of tort law).
135 Cf supra note 118 and accompanying text (providing additional avenues of recovery under Title VII).
136 See Martha Chamallas, Shifting Sands of Federalism:Civil Rights and Tort Claims in the
Employment Context, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 697, 717 (2006) ("Leaving harassment and discrimination out of tort law strikes me as a bad idea that artificially distorts the notion of outrageous conduct and minimizes the importance of civil rights to individuals.").
137 See supra notes 40, 44, 60, 74 and accompanying text (demonstrating interplay).
131 See infra Part D(I)-(IV) (presenting analysis supporting argument).
139 Cf supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (considering role of Title VII).
140 See supra notes 44-45 (referencing types of harm).
141 See supra notes 44-45, 51-51, 63, 76 and accompanying text (providing facts from various cases analyzing and classifying harm).
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tion of Title VII, which may then be rectified through utilization of tort
remedies. 142
Distinguishing Title VII harm and "highly personal harm" is a very
fact-intensive process.143 As discussed in Sommatino, Pfau, Mathis, Kibbe,
and Baqir, courts applying either the same-facts or "highly personal harm"
tests have long been critical of an employment discrimination claim
masked in tort. 144 In same-facts standard jurisdictions, courts have interpreted any non-Title VII claim stemming out of discriminatory practices to
45
be an extension of the Title VII employment-based discriminatory harm.1
In "highly personal harm" jurisdictions, courts have framed the question in
a way that looks at how the harm is connected to the workplace, and how it
may impact more than just the workplace. 146 The "highly personal harm"
approach involves the application of the same-facts standard; however, it
goes one step further in carving out an exception to preemption where the
harms may be more than just employment related. 147
A starting point for developing this understanding is the clear-cut
employment-based harm case. 14' The classic example of such harm is exemplified in Baqir.149 This case may then be compared with Charlot
to de150
velop a concept of what may constitute "highly personal harm."
In Baqir the plaintiff alleged retaliation in violation of Title VII, as
well as defamation and blacklisting. 151 In dismissing these complaints the
court focused on the necessity of the same-facts to prove the Title VII and

142 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing alternative harms).
143 See supra note 51 and accompanying text (examining facts in determining whether harm
was "highly personal").
144 See Mathis v. Henderson, 243 F.3d 446, 451 (8th Cir. 2001); Sommatino v. United States,
255 F.3d 704, 711 (9th Cir. 2001); Pfau v. Reed, 125 F.3d 927, 933 (5th Cir. 1997); Baqir v.
Principi, 288 F. Supp. 2d 706, 708 (W.D. N.C. 2003); Kibbe v. Potter, 196 F. Supp. 2d 48, 70 (D.
Mass. 2002).
145 See supra notes 61, 62-72, 76 & 111 and accompanying text (discussing same facts application).
146 See supra notes 44 & 88 and accompanying text (discussing "highly personal harm" application).
147 See supra notes 44 & 88 and accompany text (same).
148 See Baqir, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 708 (providing example of clear employment-based harm
case).
149

Cf id.See supra note 111 and accompanying text (outlining close proximity of Title VII

to common law claims); See also supra note 44 (discussing Nolan case holding "allegations of
discriminatory failure to promote, retaliation for discrimination complaint, and constructive discharge..." were nothing more than Title VII covered employment discrimination).
150 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (presenting facts distinguishable from
Baqir).
151 See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text (presenting causes of action).
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common law claims. 152 According to the facts as alleged, the harm suffered by the plaintiff involved allegedly false information reported to prospective employers.153 The harm, as alleged, is mostly employment reputa154
tional harm.
In Charlot the plaintiff alleged defamation along with Title VII
claims. 155 Charlot's allegations focused on Leishman's public classification of her as a "threat" and his statement that she had attempted to evade
military police.156 Leishman also made allegedly false statements to a superior when requesting a ten-day suspension. 157 Further, allegedly defamatory statements were made by Moore when he referred to Charlot as "crazy" during his investigation. 15 The harms in this circumstance appear to
be a mixed-bag of employment reputational and personal reputational

harm. 159
At first glance, it would appear that the harm to a reputation being
a "highly personal harm distinct from the harm her Title VII claim seeks to
address" would inherently include the harm suffered in Baqir; however, the
cases are distinguishable. 16 In Baqir, the alleged harm from the defamation and blacklisting was purely employment-based, which is the type of
harm for which Title VII provides redress.161 In contrast, Leishman outwardly making false statements to colleagues, friends, and anyone with an
open ear, as occurred in Charlot,would stretch beyond employment reputation. 162 Here the same-facts test would conclude that all common law
claims would be preempted; however, from these facts,
it is clear that there
163
was more than just employment reputational harm.
This additional harm

152
153
154

See Baqir,288 F. Supp. 2d 708 (outlining disposition of court).
See supra note 108 (explaining facts advanced to support claims).
Cf. supra note 111 and accompanying text (noting claim's similarities to Title VII). It is

possible to argue that personal harm may result, however at the outset of the allegedly defamatory
statements the main interest harmed is of an employment nature. Much like in cases of IIED, the
circumstance by which the harm originates defines the nature of the harm. Compare supra notes
99-101 and accompanying text (discussing Roland case), with supra notes 103-106 (discussing
Wallace case); see also infra note 174 (presenting origination of harm issues pertaining to IIED).
Furthermore, the advent of CRA91's compensatory damage clause would appear to contemplate
this very circumstance as it relates to harm originating in the employment context. Cf supra note
117 and accompanying text (discussing compensatory damages in CRA91).
155 See Charlot,2012 WL 3264568, at *1 (presenting claims).
156 See id. at *2 (discussing Leishman's actions).
157 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing Charlot's defamation claim).
158 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (presenting Moore's statement).
159 Cf supra note 44 (discussing varying types of harm).
160 See supra note 90 and accompanying text (outlining courts reasoning).
161 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (outlining purpose and goals of Title VII).
162 Cf supra note 44 (discussing varying types of harm).
163 See supra notes 61-72, 76 & 111 and accompanying text (discussing same facts applica-
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would allow for collateral non-Title
VII suits in jurisdictions applying the
164
standard.
harm
personal"
"highly
Leishman's comments pertaining to the suspension, and Moore's
"crazy" classification, cause the facts of Charlot to grow closer to the facts
of Baqir. 65 Where Leishman's comments were only made to Moore, the
case is identical to Baqir, as only employment opportunities were hindered. 166 Regarding the "crazy" comment, more facts would need to be
known regarding who heard the comment, so as to develop a picture as to
whether those outside an employment context were aware of these statements. 16 These matters help to draw the distinction that a false or unfavorable review or recommendation that adversely impacts an employment
condition differs from an outward attack on a person's character. 16 1 Such
an attack on a person's character would qualify as a "highly personal
169
harm," despite growing out of the same-facts as Title VII allegations.
Just as Baqir and Charlot can be broken down into different harms,
sexual harassment in the workplace is susceptible to the same considerations. 10 In Pfau, the court considered Gonzales's phone calls and insistence upon visiting the plaintiff's apartment and an offer to accompany the
plaintiff on vacation. 17 1 In Mathis, the court considered claims that a supervisor wore hats with sexualized overtones during meetings and also demanded that the plaintiff be present during drinking and poker following
one meeting. 172 In both cases, the presented facts demonstrated that the actions undoubtedly altered the condition of each victim's employment, but
could not show much more. 1 7 Where such cases would stretch beyond

tion); supra note 44 (discussing varying types of harm).
164 See supra notes 44 & 88 and accompanying text (discussing "highly personal harm" application).
165 Compare supra note 87, with supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text (discussing
facts of both cases).
166 Compare supra note 87, with supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text (discussing
facts of both cases); cf supra note 44 (discussing varying types of harm).
167 Cf. supra note 44 (discussing varying types of harm).
168 See supra note 44 (distinguishing highly personal harms from other types of employment
harms); see also supra note 89 and accompanying text (presenting Charlot court holding pertaining to defamation).
169 See supra note 88 and accompanying text (presenting Charlot court's holding as it pertained to defamation).
170 Cf supra note 44 (discussing varying types of harm); see also supra notes 149-169 and
accompanying text (presenting concepts of different types of defamation harm).
171 See supra note 6060 (presenting actions of Gonzales).
172 See Mathis v. Henderson, 243 F.3d 446, 449-50 (8th Cir. 2001) (presenting boss's actions
in workplace).
173 Compare supra note 60, with supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing facts of
both cases); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing various types of, degrees
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basic employment discrimination is where the harm is not experienced as a
result of diminished career opportunities, uncomfortable employment conditions, or other adverse employment consequences, but instead features an
act that has the capacity to harm the individual outside the working conditions of the employee. 174
The Ninth Circuit line of cases dealt with facts such as these, and
such facts serve to demonstrate the different bounds of sexual harassment,
which dictate that occurrences that are more than just harm to working
conditions be treated as such. 175 In Otto, the plaintiff alleged that her harasser followed her, telephoned her at home, and the plaintiff alleged that
she lived in constant fear of sexual assault, both inside and outside of
work. 17 6 In Brock, the plaintiff was actually raped by her boss; rape could
be classified as an act of sexual discrimination, but is much more serious
than sexual discrimination alone.177 Similarly, in Mathis, although not contemplated by the court given its rejection of the "highly personal harm"
standard, the boss's act of demanding that the plaintiff dance every dance
with him demonstrates a physical component beyond employment conditions. 17 The same can be said for Gonzales's appearance at the plaintiff's
home, which brought about both a change in employment conditions and
also a fear of sexual assault. 179
The key factor in determining what constitutes a "highly personal
harm" is whether the propounded harm is directly derived from an impact
on employment conditions or whether the harm is something further.180

of, and remedies for harm).
174 Cf supra note 44 (discussing varying types of harm). There is room here to argue that
lIED would thus fall within this category as being harm distinct from employment harm, however, the issue of lIED must focus on why the distress developed. Compare supra notes 99-101,
and accompanying text (discussing Roland case), with supra notes 103-106 (discussing Wallace
case). Distress resulting from adverse employment conditions or limited opportunities differs
greatly from distress resulting from a harassing employee. Cf supra note 44 (discussing varying
types of harm). This distinction is explored in Roland, where the plaintiff's source of her IIED
claim was her demotion and nothing more, as opposed to Wallace where the source of the plaintiff's HIED claim was from threats to the plaintiff's life, threats to plaintiff's employment, threats
of serious injury, harassing language and gestures, and stalking. Compare supra notes 99-101
and accompanying text (discussing Roland case), with supra notes 103-106 (discussing Wallace
case). The Wallace court supported this notion in noting that distress as a result of the retaliation
(i.e. threats to employment) would be preempted, but not conduct outside retaliation under Title
VII. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (outlining disposition of Wallace court).
175 Cf supra notes 40, 44 (presenting extreme instances of sexual harassment).
176 See Otto v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 754, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1986) (outlining facts of case).
177 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (presenting facts of Brock).
178 Cf supra note 44 (discussing varying types of harm); see also supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Mathis).
179 Cf. supra note 44 (discussing varying types of harm).
180 See supra note 44 (distinguishing "highly personal harm" from other types of harm); see
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The ability to classify a major offense, such as murder or rape, as a minor
offense, such as battery or employment discrimination, does not alter the
characteristics or extent of the harm. 81 This same view can be applied to
actions that contain employment-based
discriminatory harm and further in18 2
dividualized, personal harm.
II.

The FactualPredicate- DistinguishingBrown

The logical inconsistencies between the facts underlying the Brown
decision and the facts within Brock, Pfau, Mathis, Charlot, and other cases
presented within this note, give rise to the legitimacy of the "highly personal harm" approach, thereby distinguishing Brown."' In the context of a Title VII and § 1981 claim, Brown considered whether Brown's skin color
impacted a promotion opportunity.1 8 4 In contrast, the Brock court considered a supervisor who raped an employee, Pfau considered a supervisor
who showed up to an employee's home, Mathis considered meetings and
encounters with overt sexualized overtones, and Charlot considered statements outlining a public removal of a person from an office by military police.1 8 5 The circumstances of the aforementioned cases gave rise to claims
outside of "decision-based" discrimination, whether it be assault, battery,
IIED, or defamation, whereas Brown only involved Title VII and § 1981
discrimination-centered harms. 186 Given these differences, it is possible to
read Brown's "exclusive, preemptive administrative and judicial scheme
for the redress of federal employment discrimination" as applying to "decision-based" discrimination, or employment based harms, but not "highly

personal harms." 187
also supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (presenting goals of Title VII).
181 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing various types of, degrees of, and
remedies for harm).
182 See id.
183 Compare supra note 24 and accompanying text (presenting facts of Brown), with supra
notes 43, 60, 75, 87 and accompanying text (outlining facts of Brock, Pfau, Mathis, and Chariot).
184 See Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 822-24 (1976) (outlining plaintiff's
claims).
185 See supra notes 43, 60, 75, and 87 and accompanying text (outlining facts of Brock, Pfau,
Mathis, and Charlot,respectively).
186 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (outlining facts of Brown and presenting
statutes). Although not focused directly upon employment discrimination issues, § 1981 ensures
"full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
187 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (presenting legal theory surrounding
Brown); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text (presenting concept of decision-based discrimination); see also Kibbe v. Potter, 196 F. Supp. 2d 48, 68-69. (D. Mass. 2002) (demonstrating
common law claim "akin" to Title VII claim).
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Legislative Interpretation

Given the ambiguity that remains in the wake of the Brown decision, interpreting the legislative intent of Congress is the next logical step
in the analysis of Title VII. 188 The starting point for this analysis draws
upon the Supreme Court's legislative interpretation in Brown. 189 Following
the Brown decision, the CRA91 can also be seen as altering the landscape
of Title VII claims.1 90 Ultimately, the CRA91, which would appear to create further specificity and a greater argument for preemption, features language and instances of policy suggesting supplementing, rather than supplanting tort claims.1 91
The key argument in Brown, focusing on previously unavailable
and ineffective judicial remedies, gives credence to the application of Title
VII preemption to matters of "decision-based" discrimination. 192 At the
time of Brown, the EEOC had not begun to issue guidelines pertaining to
"harassment-based" Title VII claims, suggesting that such complaints were
not yet realistically contemplated.1 93 Given this reality, the understanding
that prior to the EEOA federal employees lacked an effective judicial remedy for federal employment discrimination outlines the failure to consider
"harassment-based" claims when defining Title VII's preemptive reach. 194
Although Brown has just been distinguished as not applying to the
preemption of additional tort claims in "harassment-based" cases, the
Preiserdecision, drawn upon in Brown, outlines good Supreme Court jurisprudence that specific statutes preempt general statutes. 195 The specific
versus general understanding also played a significant role in the Pfau
court's decision to reject FTCA and Title VII concurrence. 196 To clear this
188

See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text (looking to legislative intent to determine

how to apply Title VII).
189 See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (presenting Brown's interpretation of legislative intent).
190 See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text (presenting introduction of CRA91;
amending Title VII).
191 See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text (outlining increasing complexity of Title

VII following CRA91 amendment); see also infra notes 203-207 and accompanying text (presenting information relevant to supplemental, non-preempting policy within CRA9 1).
192 See Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976) (discussing inadequate remedies); see also supra notes 10-11 (explaining application of Title VII to "decision-based" discrimination).
193 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (noting date EEOC implemented sexual harassment guidelines).
194 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting date of Brown decision); supra note 19
and accompanying text (noting issuing date of EEOC's guidelines).
195 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing Preiser).
196 See Pfau v Reed, 125 F.3d 927, 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing specific versus gen-
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hurdle, it is essential to look at the purposes of, and legislative intent behind, Title VII. 197
Title VII was enacted in 1964 to remove barriers historically favoring one class of employees over another.198 With the passage of the EEOA,
Title VII became more refined, and now includes complimentary administrative and judicial means to "eradicate federal employment discrimination," coverage of "venue, the appointment of attorneys, attorneys' fees,
and the scope of relief," and establishes primary responsibility for preventing discrimination on the federal employer.1 99 Despite this fine-tuning,
Congressional debate prior to the passage of the EEOA focused on the lack
of an applicable and efficient judicial remedy for federal employees.20 0
Prior to the EEOA, employees may have avoided seeking judicial remedy
for fear of antagonizing superiors, especially given the minimal likelihood
they would actually recover any back pay or compensation. 20
These
changes, coupled with the original intention of Title VII as removing barriers, and a lack of compensatory damage provisions, signify that Title VII in
its pre-1991 form may have specificity regarding "discrimination-based"
harms, but was not geared toward "harassment-based" harms.20 2
With the enactment of the CRA91, Title VII came to include compensatory damage rights, jury trial rights, and specific caps upon relief; becoming an even more specific and well-constructed statute carrying concepts beyond correcting "discrimination-based" harms. 20 3 Despite these
inclusions, the purposes surrounding the enactment of the CRA91 indicate
that the CRA91 was aimed at providing "appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace. 20 4 This
language, substituting "appropriate" for "additional," differs from the Congressional finding that "additional remedies under Federal law are needed
to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the work-

eral preemption).
197 See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (looking to legislative intent to determine
how to apply Title VII).
198 See supra note 134 and accompanying text (presenting purpose of Title VII).
199 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (outlining specificity of Title VII).
200 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (presenting lack of pre-Title VII judicial remedy
for employment discrimination).
201 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing pitfalls of pre-Title VII employment
discrimination law).
202 See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text (noting inclusion of additional rights
under Title VII in 1991); supra note 134 and accompanying text (outlining purpose of Title VII).
203 See supra notes 117-120 and accompany text (discussing CRA91).
204 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. La. No. 102-166, § 3, Stat. 1071 (1991) (explaining
purposes of CRA91).

332

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XIX

place ....
Coupling the term "appropriate remedies" with language
under the limitations section of the compensatory damage clause- "Compensatory damages awarded under this section ...,"(emphasis added) gives reason to believe "appropriate remedies" modifies only damages under Title VII. Such an interpretation also respects the Congressional finding and policy goal of deterring discrimination and harassment in the
workplace. 206 Given this interpretation, credence can be given to the First
Circuit interpretation that "Title VII is designed to supplement, not to supplant existing laws." 20
IV. PracticalImplication
Applying Brown and specific versus general preemption to cases
involving harms other than "decision-based" discrimination yields results
contrary to common sense.201 Under the "same-facts" reading of Title VII,
victims of employment discrimination could bring a Title VII action for
conduct that is both assaultive and discriminatory, but not a FTCA, or state
law, tort claim. 20 9 This victim could then recover up to, but no greater
than, the amounts established under the CRA91.2 10 Inexplicably, if the
same conduct was solely assaultive, the FTCA or state law tort claim would
not be preempted and there would be no recovery cap, which is a result that
the Brock court stated would turn Title VII on its head.2 11
Suppose a supervisor was to intentionally spill things on minority
employees every time he walked by their desk, but did not do the same to
white employees. This conduct, depending on damages and fulfillment of
the appropriate elements, may qualify for any number of torts, including
trespass to chattels, conversion, assault, or battery.212 Similarly, this con-

205

Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071; see also supra note

117 (providing language from Congressional finding).
206 See supra note 117 ("[A]dditional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace."); see also note 134 and accompany text (outlining purpose of Title VII).
207 See supra note 93 and accompanying text (reviewing relevant First Circuit case law).
208 See Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining potentially
illogical result).
209 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing issues with preemption).
210 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (outlining means of recovery); see also supra
notes 117-120 and accompanying text (explaining CRA91 recovery caps).
211 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (outlining preemption issues).
212 See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965) (discussing battery); James D.
Burlison, 10 Mo. PRAC., PETITIONS § 7.0 (3d ed., 2013) (discussing conversion); Tracy Bateman
Farrell, 104 N.Y. JUR. 2D TRESPASS § 8 (2012) (discussing trespass to chattels); Peter Nash
Swisher, et. al, VA. PRAC. TORT AND PERSONAL INJURY LAW § 2:10 (2012) (discussing assault).
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duct likely creates a hostile work environment. 2 " Now assume this supervisor was to do the same to every minority non-employee who walked in
the door, but not to white non-employees. Under Brown and the "samefacts" interpretation, the non-employee would be free to sue the supervisor
or employer under any applicable tort theory.2 14 The employee's only remedy would be to sue under Title VII, despite the equally applicable circumstances toward the employee and non-employee.2 5 Further complicating
the issue, if the spilling were to occur only on one occasion and hypothetically ruined the employees' $1,000 suit, the employee would be free to sue
the supervisor individually to recover appropriate damages. 216
E. CONCLUSION
Discriminatory conduct may fall under the guise of a boss speaking
to an employee in sexualized overtones, or failing to promote based upon
sex or race, however, discriminatory conduct may also cross the line to being assaultive, defamatory, or all-together incredibly violative of personal
dignity. Reaching this conclusion would begin by analyzing the facts of
each case. Where the actions may have originally qualified as preempted
under the same-facts inquiry, suspicion would underlie the "highly personal
harms" inquiry. This inquiry would intend on distinguishing employment
harms from personal harms, as discussed in Part D(I). If it is determined
that the harm is more than just employment harm, or is something that is at
least in the realm of employment harm, then additional tort claims would
be permissible. The role of "highly personal harms" torts is to act in conjunction with the supplementary, and non-supplanting, Title VII claims, to
ensure that victims are not limited by the employment-based harm cap set
forth in the CRA91. Instead, where a victim's harm goes beyond employment-based harm, he should be free to recover damages arising from that
harm, even if they exceed the compensatory cap.
In the spirit of further improving workplace conditions, and discouraging employment discrimination, utilizing the "highly personal harm"
approach supplants the expansive view of preemption in Brown, provides
remedies addressing the true nature of harm experienced by employees, and

213

See John R. Paddock, Jr., 16A COLO. PRACTICE, EMP'T L. & PRACTICE

HANDBOOK §

8.11 (2013) (defining elements of hostile work environment); see also supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (outlining types of "harassment-based" discrimination).
214 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (presenting reason of legitimate recovery).
215 See supra notes 45, 58 and accompanying text (articulating limitation upon recovery).
216 Cf.supra note 44, 58 and accompanying text (requiring Title VII component for preemption analysis).
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bolsters the policy goals of Title VII, including supplementing existing
laws. Title VII, enacted in 1964, and subsequently amended twice to further worker protections and interests, has served as a beacon of progress for
employee rights. Utilizing the "highly personal harm" approach functions
to assure employee-victims that they have the same right to statutory and
common law protections and remedies as a non-employee victims, and acts
to further improve workplace conditions, while also discouraging employment discrimination.
Robert M. Mahoney

